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ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW

EPTL § 5-3.3: Right of parents and/or issue to challenge excessive gifts to
charity is reaffirmed.

Section 5-3.3 of the EPTL 0 0 is one of several legislative exceptions to the general rule that whenever possible a will should be
construed in accordance with the intent of the testator.' t The
statute provides that when a decedent has directed that more than
one-half of his estate be used for charitable purposes, 10 2 any parent
or issue' 0 3 who as a distributee or residual legatee would receive 0 a4
pecuniary benefit from successful litigation may contest the gift.
Although testamentary bequests to nonprofit institutions are not
contrary to the public policy of the State, 0 5 the statute reflects the
100EPTL § 5-3.3 provides in pertinent part:
A person may make a testamentary disposition of his entire estate to any person for
a benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious or missionary
purpose, provided that if any such disposition is contested by the testator's surviving
issue or parents, it shall be valid only to the extent of one-half of such testator's
estate, wherever situated, after the payment of debts, subject to the following:
1) An issue or parent may not contest a disposition as invalid unless he will
receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful contest as a beneficiary under the will
or as a distributee.
For a brief survey of the history of this provision in New York, see TEMPORARY STATE
COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAw OF ESTATES,
FOURTH REPORT 215-23 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION ON ESTATES].

The first, safest and most urgent rule of testamentary construction is the one
that says that whenever possible the testament is to be construed in accord with the
actual intent of the testator including his presumed intent to dispose of his whole
estate by will.
In re Estate of Dammann, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 504, 191 N.E.2d 452, 453, 240 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970
(1963).
102 For examples of the types of nonprofit institutions whose receipt of charitable
bequests was held to be controlled by earlier codifications of the present EPTL § 5-3.3, see
Unger v. Loewy, 236 N.Y. 73, 140 N.E. 201 (1923) (Cornell University, Johns Hopkins
Uni'ersity, Leland Stanford, Jr., University), In re Will of Yadach, 5 App. Div. 2d 355, 172
N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't 1958) (bequest to pastors of various churches for celebration of
masses for testator and his wife), In re Rowland's Will, 225 App. Div. 118, 232 N.Y.S. 127 (2d
Dep't 1928) (Young Men's Christian Association), and In re Estate of Watkins, 118 Misc. 645,
194 N.Y.S. 342 (Sur. Ct. Orange County 1922) (Odd Fellows' Lodge).
'03A surviving spouse is not included in the excessive gifts to charity provision because
he is thought to be sufficiently protected by the right of election provided in EPTL § 5-1.1.
See COMMISSION ON ESTATES, supra note 100, at 227-28. First enacted in 1929 as Decedent
Estate Law § 18, ch. 229, § 4, [1929] N.Y. Laws 500, EPTL § 5-1.1 protects the surviving
spouse from total disinheritance by granting him a personal right of election to take a share
of the decedent's estate. See In re Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56 (1933); In re Estate of
Dunham, 63 Misc. 2d 1029, 314 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sur. Ct. Greene County 1970); In re Estate of
Topazio, 175 Misc. 132, 22 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1940). For an extensive
analysis of the 5-1.1 right of election, see 9A P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
$ 5-1.1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN]; Arenson, Surviving Spouse's Right of Election and
ItsApplication to Testamentary Substitutes, 20 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1974).
'04For a discussion of the standing requirements under the statute, see ROHAN, supra
note 103,
5-3.3[4].
0' Public policy encourages the support of charitable, benevolent, scientific, religious,
and educational institutions. EPTL § 5-3.3, like its predecessors, merely prevents "the giving
10'
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legislative concern with protecting "the natural objects of the testator's bounty from improvident gifts to their neglect."' 10 6 Thus,
parents or issue who choose to contest the gift will thereby obtain
that portion of the charitable bequest in excess of one-half of the
estate which would otherwise pass to them under the will or in
intestacy.'

07

In re Estate of Eckart'0 8 represents the latest judicial attempt to
reconcile the purpose of the statute with the rule that a testator's
expressed intent should prevail. In Eckart, the decedent bequeathed $50 to each of her two children and the balance of her
estate to the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed without
opinion Surrogate Laurino's decision that the children should be
permitted to contest the charitable bequest.10 9 The surrogate ruled
that the $50 bequests did not evince an intent on the part of Julik
Eckart to disinherit her children should any part of her estate fall
into intestacy, and therefore the children were not barred from
sharing in the part of the estate that would lapse into intestacy as a
t l0
result of the contest"
The court's concern with determining the testator's intent before permitting the children to contest the will under section 5-3.3
is a result of the holding of In re Estate of Cairo."' In Cairo, the
testatrix bequeathed more than half of her estate to charity. Her
will further provided that "for good and sufficient reason" no
2
bequests were being made to her grandson or daughters-in-law."1
of an undue proportion [of an estate] to charity by will, when certain near relations have, in
the opinion of the legislature, a better claim." Trustees of Arfiherst College v. Ritch, 151
N.Y. 282, 334, 45 N.E. 876, 891 (1897). Accord, Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95
N.Y. 166 (1884).
"'In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 4 Misc. 2d 410, 411, 147 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1955).
107 EPTL § 5-3.3(a)(2) restricts the right to share in the estate to those who actually
contest the charitable bequest and further provides that no contestant's share may exceed
the amount to which he would have been entitled had all eligible persons contested.
One commentator has stated that "[t]he public policy underlying EPTL § 5-3.3 cannot
be considered a very strong one." ROHAN, supra note 103, $ 5-3.3(8]. Presumably, since the
statute contains no formal requirements for waiver, a waiver or release of the right to contest
can occur from the mere failure to assert one's rights., Id. In contrast, recognizing that
protection of a surviving spouse is a vitally important purpose of the law of wills and estates,
the legislature added very stringent waiver requirements to the right of election provisions.
Such a waiver must be in writing, subscribed, and acknowledged. See EPTL § 5-1.1(f).
"' 48 App. Div. 2d 61, 368 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'g mem., 72 Misc. 2d 934,
339 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1973).
10' 72 Misc. 2d at 937, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
110Id.
111 35 App. Div, 2d 76, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd mein., 29 N.Y.2d 527,
272 N.E.2d 574, 324 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971).
112 35 App. Div. 2d at 77, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (emphasis omitted).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:575

The court held that section 5-3.3 did not give the grandson standing to contest the will in light of the testatrix's clear intent that he
not benefit from the estate' 1 3 and the dominant scheme of the
instrument that the entire estate go to charity. 14 In effect, this
ruling meant that the mere addition of express words of disinheritance in a will is sufficient to override the legislative policy permitting parents or issue to contest charitable bequests.11 5
Courts have since struggled to interpret the Cairo decision in
such a way as to preserve the right to contest excessive charitable
t 7
bequests.' 16 For example, the will in In re Estate of Norcross"
contained language stating that no provision had been made therein for the testator's children since they had already been provided
for through inter vivos trusts. The surrogate determined that since
"[a]n intent to deprive these distributees of property which might
pass to them through intestacy is not evident in the will . . ." the
children could contest the charitable bequest." 8 A similar result
was reached in In re Estate of Rothko," 9 where the decedent's will
explicitly provided that his children should only inherit in the
20
event of their mother's death.1
In an attempt to distinguish Cairo, courts 12 1 have interpreted
the decision as requiring that the words of disinheritance in the will
"unambiguously extend to intestate property as well as testamen113Id. at 78, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The rationale employed in Cairo was subsequently
described as the "crystal clear intent" test. See In re Estate of Eckart, 48 App. Div. 2d 61, 63,
368 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (2d Dep't 1975) (Christ J., concurring); In re Estate of Norcross, 67
Misc. 2d 932, 937, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), aff'd mem., 39 App.
Div. 2d 874, 334 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1st Dep't 1972).
"' 35 App. Div. 2d at 78, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28.
'5 One commentator considered Cairo, "as a practical matter, to have emasculated
EPTL 5-3.3 .... " Tarbox, Decedent's Estates, 1973 Survey of New York Law, 25 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 253, 263 (1973). Justice Christ approved of this view in his concurting opinion in
Eckart. 48 App. Div. 2d at 66, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (Christ J., concurring).
16 In light of the doctrine of stare decisis, the result reached in Cairo can be avoided
"only if a distinction can be drawn between the language of the will considered in Cairo and
the language of the will" actually at issue. In re Estate of Norcross, 67 Misc. 2d 932, 937, 325
N.Y.S.2d 477, 482 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), aff'd mem., 39 App. Div. 2d 874, 334
N.Y.S.2d 600 (1st Dep't 1972).
"17 67 Misc. 2d 932, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), aff'd mern., 39 App.
Div. 2d 874, 334 N.Y.S.2d 600 (lst Dep't 1972), discussed in 17B McKINNEY's EPTL § 5-3.3,
commentary at 117 (Supp. 1975).
1' 67 Misc. 2d at 937-38, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
119 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
120 In Rothko, the surrogate found that "[t]here exists no basis for a conclusion that this
decedent ever intended to disinherit his issue in every event, as ... in the Cairo decision." Id. at
76, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 669 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the testator's children were permitted to contest the charitable bequest. Id.
121See In re Estate of Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1972); In re Estate of Norcross, 67 Misc. 2d 932, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1971).
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tary dispositions.' 2 2 Yet, in Cairo, the words of disinheritance that
were held to bar the grandson's contest of the charitable gift referred merely to the fact that no testamentary bequests were being
made in his favor;123 the issue of intestate succession was not
mentioned in the will at all. It is therefore submitted that Cairo
does not require the presence of specific words of disinheritance as
to both testamentary and intestate dispositions in order to sustain a
finding that a 5-3.3 contest is precluded. While Cairo indicated that
the testatrix's intent as to "her entire estate" was to disinherit the
family members involved, 12 4 the decision did not further define
"entire estate" as necessarily encompassing both types of dispositions. Accordingly, Caira appears to disallow any contest simply if
an intent to disinherit is clearly ascertainable from the language of
the will. Such an interpretation of Cairo formed the basis of the
court's opinion in In re Estate of Newkirk, 125 where the surrogate
ruled that a $100 bequest from an estate worth approximately
$75,000 "must be deemed to be so de minimis as to establish
[testatrix's] strong intent to effectually disinherit petitioner."1 2 6 In
Newkirk, as in Cairo, the court considered the language of the will
with regard to bequests alone, from that inferred an intent to
27
disinherit the issue entirely, and thus disallowed the contest.'
1 28
Under this analysis, Cairo and Eckart are indistinguishable.
122 Brief for Petitioners-Respondents for argument to the Court of Appeals at 5, In re
Estate of Eckart.
An example of testamentary language that was held to bar a daughter's right to take her
intestate share of her mother's estate under EPTL § 4-1.1 was found in the will considered in
In re Estate of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sur. Ct. Rockland County 1972),
affd minem., 44 App. Div. 2d 774, 354 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1974). The will stated:
I give and bequeath unto my daughter.., the sum of five dollars, and it is my will
that this provision be in lieu and bar of every right and interest in and to my estate
... since ...she has been disobedient and ungrateful and has failed to return the
affection and trust that I have bestowed upon her.
70 Misc. 2d at 397, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59.
123See text accompanying note 112 supra.
124 35 App. Div. 2d at 77, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
125172 N.Y.L.J. 54, Sept. 16, 1974, at 20, col. 7 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County).
12 Id., col. 8.
127 The Newkirk will contained seven specific bequests, the smallest of which was the
petitioner's $100. The remainder of the $75,000 estate was bequeathed to two Roman
Catholic institutions for the purpose of having masses said for the decedent and other family
members. In addition to inferring from the nominal bequest an intent to disinherit the
grandson, the court placed great emphasis on the testatrix's motives in making the charitable
bequest. Since arranging for such masses was a practice in keeping with the testatrix's
religious faith, the surrogate determined that the bequests must be deemed a constitutionally
protected exercise of religious freedom not to be lightly infringed upon after death. Id.
12 Justices Latham and Shapiro, dissenting in Eckart, recognized that the nominal
legacies in the will "tend to support the testatrix's intent to disinherit ...." 48 App. Div. 2d
at 67-68, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Latham & Shapiro, JJ., dissenting). Regarding the factual
situation in Eckart as almost identical to that in Cairo, the dissenters concluded that the
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The disinheriting langiage in Eckart, like that in Cairo, which was
treated as an effective bar to a 5-3.3 contest, referred only to
testamentary bequests. If in Cairo one could justifiably infer that
the testatrix did not intend that the petitioner share in any part of
the estate, the same conclusion could be reached in Eckart.'2 9 As
Justice Christ noted in his lengthy concurring opinion in Eckart,
"[t]he error in Cairo is the search for the testatrix's intention when
the statute is designed to make that intention immaterial."1 30 An
analogy can be drawn to EPTL section 5-1.1, which protects a
disinherited spouse by granting him the right to elect against his
spouse's will notwithstanding any expressed intent of the deceased
to leave him nothing. 131 Since the legislature has determined that
in this situation testamentary intent should not control, 32 no words
of disinheritance can defeat this right of election. Similarly, courts
should not permit section 5-3.3, specifically drafted to protect disinherited parents or issue,1 33 to be overridden by the mere insertion of a carefully drafted disinheritance provision.
At the same time it should be recognized that the statute has
several other loopholes that may defeat the legislative purpose
which prompted its enactment. As Justice Christ noted, a testator
may include in the will a gift-over provision directing that in the
event of a successful contest the estate pass to a third party.' 3 4 In
children's notices of election to contest the gift to charity should have been declared invalid.
ld.
I In interpreting testamentary intent, courts have looked to expressions of love and
129
affection in the will as. negating an intent to disinherit. Compare In re Estate of Norcross, 67
Misc. 2d 932, 325 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (expression of aff,.-'ion toward
children and reference to gifts previously given to them) and In re Estate of Rothko, 71 Misc.
2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (attitude of testator toward children
similar to that in Norcross) with In re Estate of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sur.
Ct. Rockland County 1972), aff'd mem., 44 App. Div. 2d 774, 354 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't
1974) ($5 bequest because of disobedience and ungratefulness of daughter).
The wills in Eckart and Cairo, however, contain no clear-cut expressions of either
affection or hostility, but merely state that the testatrix had "good and sufficient" reason for
acting as she did. In re Estate of Eckart, 72 Misc. 2d 934, 938, 339 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (Sur.
Ct. Queens County 1973); In re Estate of Cairo, 35 App. Div. 2d 76, 77, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925,
927 (2d Dep't 1970). It therefore seems unwarranted to infer that the language in the Eckart
will, or for that matter the language involved in Cairo, is "tantamount to a showing of an
estrangement between the testatrix and her two children." Brief for the Attorney General
for argument to the Court of Appeals at 3, In re Estate of Eckart.
130 48 App. Div. 2d at 64, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 30 (Christ, J., concurring).
131 See note 103 supra.
132 As noted by the Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 236
N.E.2d 152, 155, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (1968), "[u]nlike the expressions of intent which
constitute testamentary dispositions, the right of election ...is statutory in nature and exists
wholly outside of, and in direct contravention to, the provisions of a will."
133 See COMMISSION ON ESTATES, supra note 100, at 207, which reflects the view that
EPTL § 5-3.3 operates to render the decedent's expressed intent immaterial, at least with
respect to half of his estate.
134 48 App. Div. 2d at 67, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Christ, J., concurring). The will in In re
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the. presence of such a clause, there can be no contest of the
charitable gift since the parent or issue will necessarily fail to satisfy
the statutory requirement that "he . . .receive a pecuniar) benefit
from a successful contest . . . ."135 Moreover, section 5-3.3 in no

way restricts a testator's ability to bequeath half of his estate to
charity and half to a total stranger, thus leaving penniless those
dependents whom the law requires he support during his
lifetime.1 3 6 Concededly, the overruling of the unfortunate holding
in Cairo would not remedy all of these problems. It would be a first
step, however, toward preventing the circumvention of the clear
legislative policy, underlying section 5-3.3.
Editor's Note. As The Survey goes to print, Eckart has been reversed
on appeal, 175 N.Y.L.J. 91, May 11, 1976, at 4, col. 1 (Ct. App.).
Although the Court of Appeals did reject the Cairo rationale, it
considered itself compelled to reaffirm the Cairo result. The Court
declared that "it is the statute itself

. .

which disrupts the stated

legislative purpose. . . . [and] [i]f there is to be a constructive
change it should come from the Legislature." Id., col. 4.
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Lait § 671(4): Use of an interrogatory to determine qualification
under no-fault's threshold "serious injury" test.
New York's enactment of the Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act,1 37 popularly known as the no-fault insurEstate of Fitzgerald, 72 Misc. 2d 472, 339 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972),
provided that should there be a 5-3.3 contest to the bequest made therein to the Archdiocese
of New York, the gift should pass personally to the Archbishop of New York without
limitation or restriction on its use. The court held that "a clause providing for an alternative
disposition ... may deprive a parent or issue... of any status to contest under EPTL 5-3.3."
Id. at 475, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337. One proposal to close this loophole advocates ignoring the
alternative provisions of the will for the purpose of allowing those persons who would
otherwise participate in the distribution of the excess to contest the will. See COXIMISSION ON
ESTATES, supra note 100, at 228.
For a discussion of the possibility that, in addition to the gift-over loophole, the policy of
the statute may also be circumvented by an inter vivos gift, in trust or otherwise, for
charitable purposes, see 17B McKINNEY'S EPTL § 5-3.3, commentary at 782 (1967). The
various types of inter vivos dispositions that may be -employed are outlined in Fisch, Restrictions on Charitable Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F. 307, 331 (1964).
135 EPTL § 5-3.3(a)(1).
,3 Surrogate Midonick, in In re Estate of Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), proposed that the surrogate have the power to impose
temporary and reasonable support obligations on all solvent estates until young dependents
reach the age of majority or are able to provide for themselves. In the alternative, he
suggested that the legislature could enact a formula to impose a trust on an estate until the
children come of age. Id. at 78-79, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71.
137 Ch. 13, § 1, [1973] N.Y. Laws 56 (codified at N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney
Supp. 1975)).

